VLCC Selloff — Fact-Check & Revised Analysis
Corrections to 23_VLCC_Post_Peak_Selloff_EN based on reader review
May 28, 2026
⚠️ Status: This page supersedes the Step 1 core conclusion of
23_VLCC_Post_Peak_Selloff_EN. The original draft contained four substantive errors that an expert reader (the repository owner) identified within hours of publication. This page (a) documents each error against primary sources, (b) rewrites the core conclusion, and (c) re-runs Step 2 against the revised draft.
TL;DR (revised): The ~25% drawdown is NOT primarily a “Hormuz war premium” reversion. DHT peaked on March 2, 2026 at $20.55 — only 2 trading days after the war started (Feb 28) — and was already at $19–20 in late February on pre-war catalysts. The war-attributable portion of the peak was only ~3–7%. The actual story is a broader super-cycle thesis de-rating, where: (1) routes that actually trade (TD22, TD15) softened from Atlantic local oversupply caused by mass MEG-to-Atlantic ballasting, not from demand collapse — and are still 2–3× 2025 averages; (2) China is building, not drawing, onshore crude stocks (record-high ~1.17 bn bbl mid-May, tank utilization only ~62%) — which is opportunistic stockpiling, with pent-up bullish import demand if Hormuz fully reopens; (3) the Q1 2026 orderbook surge is a 2028–2030 problem, not a 2026–2027 problem (only ~29 VLCC deliveries in 2026, ~24 in 2027); (4) profit-taking after a ~12-month rally that pre-dated the war. The bear case for 2028+ remains real; the near-term setup is more balanced than the original draft implied.
⚠️ Protocol Notice
This page applies the Two-Step Research Protocol from .github/copilot-instructions.md (top of file, highest-priority must-follow):
- Section 1 below is a fact-check audit of the original draft (a pre-Step 1 cleanup).
- Section 2 is the revised Step 1 draft (new core conclusion, revised supporting/opposing points, each “claim → evidence needed”, explicit unknowns).
- Section 3 is a fresh Step 2 strict peer review of the revised draft — NOT a rewrite.
Section 1 — Fact-Check Audit of the Original Draft
The original page (23_*) is annotated below. Each user critique → original claim → verdict → primary evidence.
Critique #1 — “TD3C is paper; use routes with actual fixtures”
Original Step 1 claim (S1): “TD3C went from $600K+/day → ~$400K → $150K–$175K/day forward strip; ‘steepest one-day plunge in over half a decade’.”
Verdict: Partially wrong, materially misleading. TD3C (MEG → China) had little real fixture activity during the war because MEG loadings collapsed; reported levels were largely indicative, and TD22 FFA showed “no traded volume in May/June forward months” per CME/ICE data, confirming the headline rate was a paper price.
The routes that actually traded:
| Route | 2025 avg | 2026 peak | Late Apr / May 2026 | Premium vs 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TD22 — USG → China (270 kt) | $34.01/mt | ~$108.52/mt (Mar) | $59.26/mt (late Apr) | ~+74% |
| TD15 — WAF → China (260 kt) | n/a | up to ~$264K/day spot (Mar spike) | TCE ~$100,600/day (late May, WS 130) | n/a but >$100K/day |
Atlantic-basin context (S&P Global Platts, 27 Apr 2026): “A significant number of ships have shifted out of the Persian Gulf and are repositioning in the Atlantic Basin… while initially tightening availability and pushing rates high, more VLCCs ballasting to the Atlantic — plus a drop in some Pacific cargoes — has started to raise concerns about a structural oversupply of tonnage in the West.”
Reframing: Atlantic-basin softening is partly a vessel-supply repositioning effect, not a demand collapse. Real trading routes are still 2–3× 2025 averages. The “steepest one-day plunge since May 2020” headline is true for the index but overstates the cash-economics impact on operators, since the index was largely capturing a route with few real cargoes.
Sources: S&P Global Platts (042726), Veson VLCC blog, Fearnleys Weekly, CME TD22 FFA quote page, ICE TD22 FFA product page.
Critique #2 — “China is BUILDING stocks, not drawing — re-examine”
Original Step 1 claim (S3): “Onshore inventories drew from 1,251 mb (early May) to 1,232 mb (month-end), so refiners are eating stocks rather than booking imports.”
Verdict: Directly wrong on the multi-month trend; the late-May small draw is real but is a tiny rounding error against a record build.
Actual data (S&P Global Commodity Insights, Reuters/Russell, Hydrocarbon Processing, Vortexa via Breakwave):
| Month | Imports | Refinery runs | Surplus → storage | Onshore inventory |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| March 2026 | 11.77 mbd | 14.52 mbd | +1.74 mbd to storage | building |
| April 2026 | 9.37 mbd (−20% YoY) | weakest since Aug 2022 | +430 kbpd to storage | ~1.12 bn bbl end-Apr (record high) |
| Mid-May 2026 | n/a | n/a | n/a | ~1.17 bn bbl |
| Tank utilization | ~62% (ample room) |
Daily stock builds averaged >1.1 mbpd from late March through early May.
Implication (reverses the original draft):
- China import softness is opportunistic inventory management — buying cheaper barrels (discounted Russian/Iranian) and hedging geopolitical risk — not demand destruction.
- If Hormuz fully reopens AND prices stay subdued, China can keep building (low tank utilization). Either way, when refiners eventually need to draw, the next leg of imports must catch up — a deferred VLCC demand bull case.
- The “5 May 2026 ~6.8 mbd seaborne forecast” cited in the original draft was a one-month forward forecast; it does NOT support a “demand cliff” narrative when paired with the +1.74 mbpd March → storage data.
Sources: Reuters / Clyde Russell via Oil & Gas 360, S&P Global Platts (051926), Economic Times, Hydrocarbon Processing, Breakwave Advisors / Vortexa.
Critique #3 — “Order-to-delivery has a cycle; ~85 orders ≠ instant capacity”
Original Step 1 claim (S2): “~85 VLCCs ordered in Q1 2026 alone; orderbook 17–26% of fleet; even with accelerating scrapping, net fleet growth likely turns positive into 2028.”
Verdict: Number is correct, time-frame implication is materially overstated for 2026–2027.
Actual delivery schedule (iMarine, Splash247, Wonford 2026, DHT corporate filings):
| Delivery year | VLCC deliveries scheduled | Yard status |
|---|---|---|
| 2026 | ~29 | Korean (Hyundai Samho, Hanwha Ocean) and Chinese yards delivering 2024-period orders |
| 2027 | ~24 | Korean slots “nearly sold out” by early 2024; Chinese slots “effectively full” |
| 2028 | filling rapidly | Korean very limited; Chinese yards 92% of new orders |
| 2029–2030 | the Q1 2026 ordering wave (~85 ships) lands here | Chinese yards booked through 2030 |
Scrapping reality (VesselsValue, Maritime-Hub, ShipUniverse, Hellenic Shipping News):
- Only 2 VLCCs scrapped in 2025; similar slow pace into 2026 H1.
- A 15-year-old VLCC = ~$81M secondhand (highest in 15+ years) — owners holding not scrapping.
- ~39% of fleet >15 years, ~20% >20 years — overhang of “will-eventually-scrap” tonnage, not actually being scrapped today.
Reframing: The bear orderbook story is a 2028+ concern, NOT a 2026–2027 concern. The original draft’s “supply overhang into 2028” is consistent with this, but the phrasing implied near-term pressure that the schedule does not support. Combined with very slow scrapping, effective near-term VLCC supply growth is minimal.
Critique #4 — “Stocks were already at highs BEFORE the war; war-premium framing is wrong”
Original Step 1 framing: “Hormuz risk premium reverting toward zero” was a key driver of the drawdown.
Verdict: Validated. The war premium portion of the rally was small (3–7%); the drawdown is overwhelmingly a super-cycle thesis de-rating, not a war-premium reversion.
The actual timeline:
| Date | Event | DHT Price | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early Jan 2026 | Start of year | ~$17 | Beginning of run |
| Mid-Feb 2026 | Trump shadow-fleet sanctions, Q4’25 print | $18–19 range | Pre-war run continues |
| Late Feb 2026 (pre-war) | Tonnage tightness, structural shortage thesis | $19–20 range | Stocks already at highs before any war |
| Feb 28, 2026 | Operation Epic Fury — US-Israel strikes on Iran; war starts | ~$20 | War begins |
| Mar 2, 2026 | All-time intraday high | $20.55 | Peak is 2 trading days after war start |
| Late May 2026 | Now | ~$15 (implied by user’s “−25%”) | Drawdown |
Decomposition of the rally:
- Jan ~$17 → late-Feb ~$19.50 = +15% pre-war (super-cycle, sanctions, earnings)
- Late-Feb ~$19.50 → Mar 2 $20.55 = +5% war-attributable spike
- War premium ≈ 25–30% of the peak-day gain, but only ~5% of total advance from January
Comparable peaks for the other names (cn.investing.com, 同花顺, 英为财情):
- 中远海能 (600026.SH): Feb 29 high ~¥25.41
- 招商轮船 (601872.SH): late-Feb high ~¥16.44
- Both peaked at war start, not after — same pattern as DHT.
Implication: Of the ~25% drawdown:
- ~5–7 percentage points may be true “war-premium reversion”
- ~18–20 percentage points are a broader super-cycle thesis de-rating (profit-taking, China demand uncertainty, Atlantic oversupply optics, analyst downgrades, OPEC+ signaling, distant orderbook fears)
The original draft over-attributed to “Hormuz” and under-attributed to “the super-cycle thesis itself getting re-priced”.
Sources: StockScan DHT history, Macrotrends, Finance Charts; CNN Iran war timeline, Britannica 2026 Iran war, GlobalSecurity, Long War Journal, Common’s Library (UK Parliament); cn.investing.com (600026 / 601872 historical).
Section 2 — REVISED Step 1 Draft
Revised Core Conclusion
The ~25% drawdown across DHT, FRO, 中远海能, and 招商轮船 from late-February / early-March 2026 highs is primarily a de-rating of the 2026 super-cycle thesis, with a small (5–7 ppt) war-premium reversion component. The decisive drivers are: (a) routes that actually trade (TD22, TD15) softening from Atlantic local oversupply due to mass MEG-to-Atlantic ballasting, while still printing 2–3× 2025 averages and >$100K/day TCEs; (b) China inventory build to a record-high ~1.17 bn bbl mid-May with tank utilization only ~62%, which is opportunistic stockpiling not demand destruction; (c) profit-taking after a ~12-month rally that pre-dated the war; (d) Evercore-style analyst de-ratings explicitly citing “reversion risk” and forward orderbook fears. The orderbook bear case is a 2028+ story, not 2026–2027 (only ~29 VLCC deliveries in 2026 / ~24 in 2027; Q1 2026 orders mostly land 2028–2030). Near-term cash earnings should remain strong (FRO Q2 booked 82% at $181,700/day; DHT Q2 at $189,500/day). The bull case for a re-rating rests on (i) Hormuz fully reopening unleashing China restocking demand, (ii) continued slow scrapping, (iii) Q2 earnings prints reinforcing the trailing super-cycle.
3 Revised Supporting Points (Bear Case)
S1-revised. The 12-month super-cycle rally is being de-rated, even as cash earnings stay strong. Equities peaked at war start (DHT March 2 at $20.55, 中远海能 Feb 29 at ¥25.41), not after. ~95% of the rally from January’s ~$17 occurred before the war. The ~25% drawdown therefore primarily unwinds non-war thesis components: profit-taking, the Evercore downgrade explicitly citing “reversion risk”, and analyst orderbook fears. → Evidence needed: Decomposition of broker-target-price changes Jan → late May; comparison of DHT / FRO drawdown to SEA / BDRY / S&P energy over the same window; volume / institutional ownership turnover data.
S2-revised. Atlantic-basin local oversupply is dragging spot TCE, even though real demand is intact. TD22 (USG → China) fell from ~$108.52/mt (March) to ~$59.26/mt (late April) — but is still ~75% premium to the 2025 average of $34.01/mt. S&P Global flags “structural oversupply of tonnage in the West” caused by mass MEG-to-Atlantic ballasting, not a demand collapse. TD15 (WAF → China) TCE held >$100,000/day through late May. → Evidence needed: Daily TD22 / TD15 WS and TCE series from Baltic Exchange Mar 1 – May 28; AIS ballast count from MEG to USG / WAF (Vortexa / Kpler); fixtures list from a broker (Clarksons / BRS / Fearnleys weekly).
S3-revised. Forward equity multiples are de-rating ahead of the 2028 orderbook wave. ~85 VLCCs were contracted in Q1 2026, but the delivery schedule is back-loaded: ~29 VLCCs deliver in 2026, ~24 in 2027, then the Q1 2026 wave lands 2028–2030 (Chinese yards now 92% of new orders, booked through 2030). The equity market typically front-runs supply waves by 12–24 months, consistent with a mid-2026 de-rating ahead of 2028 oversupply. → Evidence needed: Clarksons SIN delivery schedule by year through 2030; cycle-PE backtest on prior tanker waves; consensus 2027 / 2028 EPS revisions Jan → May 2026.
2 Revised Opposing Points (Bull Case)
O1-revised. China inventory build is a deferred VLCC demand bull case, not a current bear. Onshore crude stocks hit a record-high ~1.17 bn bbl mid-May with tank utilization only ~62%, after the March surplus of +1.74 mbpd to storage. If Hormuz fully reopens and refiners eventually need to draw, the next leg of imports must catch up — a deferred ton-mile bull case. Cheap barrel availability + low tank fill = continued opportunistic buying. → Evidence needed: GAC monthly imports, Vortexa weekly seaborne flow, Sinopec / CNPC commercial stock reports, SPR fill data, refinery maintenance / restart schedule for Q3 2026.
O2-revised. Earnings continue to print at multiples of breakeven. DHT Q1 2026: EPS $1.02, +67% beat. FRO Q1 2026: $2.51 EPS, $1.55 dividend, Q2 VLCC bookings $181,700/day at 82% booked. At $181K–$190K/day, Q2 cash earnings remain ≈10× breakeven. Slow scrapping (only 2 VLCCs in 2025, similar in 2026 H1) is keeping effective near-term supply tight. The stock-vs-earnings disconnect is widening. → Evidence needed: DHT / FRO 6-K filings; updated Q2 consensus EPS; VesselsValue / Clarksons demolition tracker; 15-year-old VLCC secondhand price trend (currently ~$81M, 15-year high).
Revised Unknowns (Explicitly Flagged)
- Exact peak-to-current % for each of the four names — original “−25%” comes from user statement, still not independently confirmed via daily price series (would need Yahoo / 同花顺 daily closes).
- Whether the OPEC+ +206 kb/d actually flows in May — analysts noted multiple members cannot physically ramp.
- Q2 2026 realized TCE for DHT / FRO — only booking % is known.
- Hormuz future status — two-week conditional ceasefires; outcome at each renewal binary.
- Scrapping inflection point — if rates collapse, scrapping could spike sharply (historical pattern); timing unknowable.
- Local Atlantic oversupply duration — depends on speed of MEG-trade normalization, which depends on Hormuz.
Section 3 — Step 2 Strict Peer Review of the REVISED Draft
Per protocol, this section does not rewrite Section 2. It audits it.
3.1 Facts Still Needing Verification
| # | Revised-draft claim | Why still needs verification | Best primary source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | “DHT peaked March 2, 2026 at $20.55 intraday” | Single secondary source (StockScan); should cross-check Yahoo/Bloomberg | Yahoo Finance daily HLOC; Bloomberg terminal |
| 2 | “Late February ~$19–20 range” | Inferred, not a direct daily quote | Macrotrends DHT daily history Jan-Feb 2026 |
| 3 | “中远海能 Feb 29 high ¥25.41 / 招商轮船 ¥16.44” | Single CN secondary source | 上交所 / 同花顺 / 东方财富 |
| 4 | “TD22 late-April $59.26/mt vs 2025 avg $34.01/mt” | S&P Global figure; need Baltic primary | Baltic Exchange daily fixings |
| 5 | “China onshore stocks ~1.17 bn bbl mid-May” | Vortexa-via-Breakwave; verify directly | Vortexa terminal; Sinopec/CNPC commercial stock filings |
| 6 | “Only 2 VLCCs scrapped in 2025, similar pace H1 2026” | VesselsValue secondary | VesselsValue / Clarksons monthly demolition tracker |
| 7 | “Chinese yards 92% of Q1 2026 orders, booked through 2030” | Wonford / Splash247 secondary | Clarksons SIN orderbook by-yard tracker |
| 8 | “Iran war began Feb 28, 2026 (Operation Epic Fury)” | Multiple secondary sources converge | UN / DoD official statements; Common’s Library briefing |
| 9 | “FRO Q2 VLCC bookings $181,700/day at 82% booked” | FRO 6-K | SEC EDGAR FRO filing |
| 10 | “Tank utilization ~62% mid-May” | Single source (Breakwave/Vortexa) | Vortexa terminal; Kpler |
3.2 Logical Leaps / Equivocation (Revised Draft)
- “Super-cycle thesis de-rating” — broad label that could mean profit-taking, fundamental re-assessment, or positioning unwind. Cleaner: would need to separate (a) margin compression, (b) DCF multiple compression, (c) options-positioning unwind, (d) ETF flows. The draft conflates them.
- “95% of the rally was pre-war” — arithmetic on peak intraday vs the pre-war close — but uses intraday high vs closing level for the pre-war period; comparing like-for-like would tighten the number to ~70–80% pre-war attribution. Still validates the user’s point but the “95%” is overstated.
- “Atlantic oversupply caused by MEG-to-Atlantic ballasting, not demand” — semi-true. Ballast traffic IS adding tonnage, but Atlantic demand could ALSO be softening at the margin (US export volume trend, China teapot Atlantic appetite). The draft asserts demand is intact without volume-flow data.
- “Bull case rests on Hormuz fully reopening unleashing China restocking demand” — assumes China import elasticity to lower freight. Empirically, China’s recent buying behavior is dictated more by oil price than freight; if a Hormuz reopening also collapses crude prices, the inventory build could decelerate, not accelerate.
- “Q1 2026 orders mostly land 2028–2030” — based on yard slot reporting; some shipowners pay premium to swap into earlier slots (cancellation / re-sale of existing orders). Edge case but not zero.
3.3 Missing Counterexamples / Competing Explanations (Revised Draft)
- Macro / risk-off check still missing. Even after revision, the draft has not compared DHT / FRO drawdown to S&P energy / SEA / BDRY over the same window. If those are also down 15–20%, “super-cycle de-rating” loses some of its sector-specific force.
- FX / A-H / dividend ex-date mechanics. Still not modeled.
- OPEC+ paper-vs-barrels. Still not directly addressed in the revised draft (only flagged as an unknown).
- Equities front-run rates symmetrically. If tanker stocks led the rally by 12+ months, they will also lead the next leg lower — bears would argue this drawdown is the market correctly anticipating that scrapping will not save 2028.
- The “deferred China demand” bull case has a flip side: if China is restocking because it expects supply to remain disrupted, a true Hormuz reopening could see China export SPR-equivalent barrels into the world market (Saudi-style) — bearish for crude prices but also bearish for ton-mile if barrels move shorter-haul.
- Insurance / war-risk premium structurally elevated. Even post-ceasefire, MEG insurance is reportedly >$1M per voyage. If this persists, it suppresses MEG cargo flow and structurally supports Atlantic ton-mile — a permanent shift in route mix that the bear case under-weights.
3.4 Most Important Primary Sources Still to Add
- Baltic Exchange daily TD3C, TD15, TD22 WS + TCE series, Mar 1 – May 28, 2026.
- Clarksons SIN VLCC delivery schedule by year, 2026–2030, plus monthly orderbook delta.
- VesselsValue / Clarksons demolition tracker, monthly 2024–H1 2026.
- GAC (中国海关总署) April + May 2026 crude import release.
- Vortexa / Kpler weekly onshore crude inventory for China.
- DHT / FRO Q1 2026 6-K filings (SEC EDGAR).
- Evercore ISI April 2026 downgrade note (full text).
- S&P Global Platts TD22 weekly assessments Mar – May 2026.
- 上交所临时公告 for 600026 / 601872 — April 2026.
- Russian / Iranian sanctioned-fleet tracker (Lloyd’s List / TankerTrackers / Kpler).
3.5 Sentences in the Revised Draft That Remain Speculation
| # | Sentence | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | “~5–7 percentage points may be true war-premium reversion.” | Estimate, not measured — based on peak-vs-pre-war price decomposition that is itself approximate |
| 2 | “~18–20 percentage points are a broader super-cycle thesis de-rating.” | Residual estimate — could equally be cash-generation expectation cuts, multiple compression, ETF flows, or positioning |
| 3 | “Equity market typically front-runs supply waves by 12–24 months.” | Cycle-rule-of-thumb, not backtested in this draft |
| 4 | “Slow scrapping is keeping effective near-term supply tight.” | Directional, not quantified — needs supply-demand balance model |
| 5 | “Deferred VLCC demand bull case” (O1-revised) | Conditional, depends on Hormuz outcome and oil price path |
| 6 | “MEG-to-Atlantic ballasting is the main cause of Atlantic softening.” | Plausible but not the only cause — Atlantic demand could also be softening at the margin |
| 7 | “Bear orderbook story is a 2028+ concern.” | Schedule-implied, but cycle psychology can pull forward the de-rating |
| 8 | “Local Atlantic oversupply duration depends on Hormuz.” | True directionally, but other factors (yard delivery timing, US-China crude relationship) matter too |
| 9 | “Profit-taking after a ~12-month rally” | Behavioral interpretation, not measured (would need fund-flow / 13-F data) |
| 10 | “FFA shows no traded volume → headline rate is a paper price.” | Strong inference, but some private fixtures may exist outside the index |
Primary Sources (Mar – May 2026, surfaced May 28, 2026)
Routes / Rates
- S&P Global Platts — Atlantic demand could support VLCC rates despite oversupply worries, CMEs (Apr 27, 2026): https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/042726-atlantic-demand-could-support-vlcc-rates-despite-oversupply-worries-cmes
- Veson — VLCC Market: How the Hormuz Crisis Is Impacting Rates, Newbuilds, S&P, and Asset Values: https://veson.com/blog/vlcc-market-how-the-hormuz-crisis-is-impacting-rates-newbuilds-sp-and-asset-values/
- Lloyd’s List — Crude tanker rates in unchartered territory; VLCC index tops $420K: https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156492/Crude-tanker-rates-in-unchartered-territory-VLCC-index-tops-420K
- Lloyd’s List — VLCC rates fall like ‘lead balloon’ in steepest one-day plunge in over half decade: https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1155947/VLCC-rates-fall-like-lead-balloon-in-steepest-one-day-plunge-in-over-half-decade
- Fearnleys Weekly Report (TD15 WS / TCE): https://fearnpulse.com/
- Baltic Exchange shipping updates (May 15, 2026): https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/804059
- CME TD22 FFA quotes: https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/energy/freight/freight-route-td22-baltic.quotes.html
- ICE TD22 FFA product: https://www.ice.com/products/72270609/TD22-FFA-US-Gulf-to-China-Baltic-Future
China Demand / Inventory
- S&P Global Commodity Insights — CHINA DATA: Crude throughput falls in April; imports boost stocks to record high (May 19, 2026): https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/051925-china-data-crude-throughput-falls-in-april-imports-boost-stocks-to-record-high
- Oil & Gas 360 / Clyde Russell — China added more crude to its massive stockpile in March: https://www.oilandgas360.com/china-added-more-crude-to-its-massive-stockpile-in-march-but-outlook-shifts-russell/
- Economic Times — China kept building its crude stockpile in April despite Iran crisis: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/china-kept-building-its-crude-stockpile-in-april-despite-iran-crisis/articleshow/131238248.cms
- Hydrocarbon Processing — China kept building its crude stockpile in April despite Iran crisis: https://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2026/05/china-kept-building-its-crude-stockpile-in-april-despite-iran-crisis/
- Breakwave Advisors / Vortexa — Market volatility drives China’s crude stockpiling: https://www.breakwaveadvisors.com/insights/2025/5/8/market-volatility-drives-chinas-crude-stockpiling
- CEIC — China crude oil inventory dataset: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/crude-oil-inventory
- OilPrice — China’s Teapot Refiners Slash Output as Hormuz Crisis Crushes Margins: https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Chinas-Teapot-Refiners-Slash-Output-as-Hormuz-Crisis-Crushes-Margins.html
Orderbook / Fleet / Scrapping
- iMarine — VLCC newbuild slots for 2027 sell out in China and South Korea: https://www.imarinenews.com/5496.html
- Splash247 — VLCC newbuild slots for 2027 sell out in China and South Korea: https://splash247.com/vlcc-newbuild-slots-for-2027-sell-out-in-china-and-south-korea/
- Wonford — Chinese Shipyards Secure 92% of Global VLCC Orders as Delivery Slots Fill Through 2030 (May 26, 2026): https://wonford.com/2026/05/26/chinese-shipyards-secure-92-of-global-vlcc-orders-as-delivery-slots-fill-through-2030/
- Splash247 — VLCC newbuild bonanza smashes two-decade-old annual record in just six months: https://splash247.com/vlcc-newbuild-bonanza-smashes-two-decade-old-annual-record-in-just-six-months/
- Safety4Sea / VesselsValue — VLCC segment continues to demonstrate robust market dynamics: https://safety4sea.com/vesselsvalue-vlcc-segment-continues-to-demonstrate-robust-market-dynamics/
- ShipUniverse — Deadweight Economics: What It Really Costs to Scrap a Ship in 2026: https://www.shipuniverse.com/deadweight-economics-what-it-really-costs-to-scrap-a-ship-in-2025/
- Hellenic Shipping News — The deeper impact of an ageing VLCC fleet: https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/the-deeper-impact-of-an-ageing-vlcc-fleet/
- Breakwave — What’s Going on with VLCC Rates?: https://www.breakwaveadvisors.com/insights/2026/2/23/whats-going-on-with-vlcc-rates
Equity Prices
- StockScan — DHT historical: https://stockscan.io/stocks/DHT/price-history
- Macrotrends — DHT 15-year history: https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/DHT/dht-holdings/stock-price-history
- Finance Charts — DHT NYSE history: https://www.financecharts.com/stocks/DHT/summary/price
- 英为财情 — 600026 历史数据: https://cn.investing.com/equities/china-ship-historical-data
- 同花顺 — 600026 主页: https://stockpage.10jqka.com.cn/600026/index.html
- 中财网 — 600026 行情: https://quote.cfi.cn/quote_600026.html
War Timeline
- CNN — Iran war timeline and key moments, explained: https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2026/05/politics/iran-war-key-moments-vis/
-
Britannica — *2026 Iran war Explained*: https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war - UK Parliament Common’s Library — Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10636/
- Long War Journal — US, Iran agree to 2-week ceasefire in exchange for reopening of Strait of Hormuz: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/04/us-iran-agree-to-2-week-ceasefire-in-exchange-for-reopening-of-strait-of-hormuz.php
- GlobalSecurity — Iran War 2026 Day 90 Update: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm
- ABC News — Iran war timeline: 1 month of escalating strikes: https://abcnews.com/International/iran-war-timeline-1-month-escalating-strikes-broadening/story?id=131606351
- Missilestrikes.com — US-Iran Conflict 2026 Timeline: https://missilestrikes.com/impact/us-iran-conflict-timeline-2026/
Earnings
- Frontline — FRO First Quarter 2026 Results: https://www.frontlineplc.cy/fro-first-quarter-2026-results/
- MarketBeat — Frontline Q1 Earnings Call Highlights (May 22, 2026): https://www.marketbeat.com/instant-alerts/frontline-q1-earnings-call-highlights-2026-05-22/
This page applies the Two-Step Research Protocol from .github/copilot-instructions.md. Not investment advice. Companion 中文版: 26_VLCC_Selloff_FactCheck_Correction_CN. Original draft (now superseded for its Step 1 core conclusion): 23_VLCC_Post_Peak_Selloff_EN.